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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Nous décrivons et analysons l’utilisation d’un marché boursier pour le financement 
d’entreprises émergentes, alors que ce rôle est généralement dévolu aux investisseurs en 
capital de risque (le capital de risque privé). Le taux de succès de ce marché public de capital 
de risque Canadien est prés de quatre fois supérieur à celui mesuré pour le marché privé. Au 
Canada, le marché public amène sept fois plus de nouvelles inscriptions sur le marché 
principal, le TSX, que ne le fait le capital de risque privé. Pour un horizon de cinq ans, le taux 
de disparition des entreprises nouvellement inscrites sur la Bourse de croissance est beaucoup 
moindre que le taux d’échec rapporté par le capital de risque. Enfin, le rendement du marché 
public est largement supérieur à celui du marché privé du capital de risque. Nous en déduisons 
que le marché public du capital de risque est parfaitement capable de concurrencer le marché 
privé, même s’il ne dispose pas des outils, habiletés et moyens d’ajout de valeur que l’on 
associe généralement au capital de risque conventionnel. 
 
Mots clés : Capital de risque, petites et moyennes entreprises, marché 
boursier, Canada, réglementation des valeurs mobilières, politiques 
publiques. 
 
We describe and analyze how a stock exchange can be used to finance emerging companies 
and to assume the role usually played by private VCs. We find that the Canadian public VC 
market has a success rate which is approximately four times the corresponding rate for 
private VC. The public VC market provides approximately seven times as many new listings to 
the main market as private VCs. For a five-year horizon, the delisting rate of newly listed 
companies is much lower than the failure rate observed for the private VC sector in Canada. 
Finally, the comparison of the returns shows that the public VC market outperforms the 
private one. We conclude that a public VC market is indeed able to compete with a private 
one, even if it does not have the tools, skills and value added capabilities usually attributed to 
private VCs. 
 
Keywords: Venture Capital, small business, stock market, Canada, securities 
regulation, public policy. 
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Venture capital (VC) is typically associated with the private placement of equity or quasi-equity 
by specialized institutional investors. For Gompers and Lerner (2001, p.155), “specialized 
financial intermediaries, such as venture capital organizations, can alleviate the information 
gaps, which allows firms to receive the financing that they cannot raise from other sources.” VC 
investors have developed methods, expertise and tools to screen, fund, advise and monitor the 
most promising ventures. Even if some of them act as business angels, individual investors are 
generally not associated with VC activities. This is probably because, as Fenn et al. (1996, p.1) 
note, “few investors had the skills necessary to invest directly in this asset class, and those that 
did found it difficult to use their skills efficiently.” Accordingly, a public VC market, where 
individual investors finance emerging companies, should not succeed or even survive. In Europe, 
several countries have implemented new (or junior) stock markets, devoted to the financing of 
growing companies. They apply more lenient listing rules and often do not require profitability. 
To be listed, companies must meet the minimal listing requirements that exclude nascent 
companies. These junior markets are commonly used as an exit vehicle by private VC providers, 
and are generally considered as failures (Bottazzi and Da Rin 2002). This verdict is consistent 
with the proposition that public markets are not well suited for financing growing companies, 
even if these companies are no longer in the early stage of development. In this context, the 
creation of a public VC market devoted mainly to early stage companies can be considered an 
unrealistic objective.    
Nonetheless, this type of market has long been active in Canada. To our knowledge, the TSX 
Venture Exchange (TSXV) is the only public VC market in the world. Although one might argue 
that the London Alternative Investment Market (AIM) and First North in the Nordic countries 
could claim this status because they apply principle-based listing standards instead of quantified 
minimum listing requirements, firms listed on the AIM are very similar to those listed on the 
main Canadian stock market, the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX). On First North, the mean 
market capitalization and initial public offering (IPO) gross proceeds represent respectively four 
and ten times those observed on the TSXV.  
The Canadian situation provides a unique opportunity to analyze the extent to which a public VC 
market can stimulate the success of emerging businesses while mitigating the multiple 
  1consequences of the large asymmetry of information prevailing in this type of financing. This 
situation also allows us to compare the outcome of two approaches to growing business finance.  
The TSXV is totally free of public policy grants and advantages, while the VC market is heavily 
distorted by generous public policies, in particular the Labour-sponsored VC fund program, 
which represents approximately half of the Canadian VC activity during the period examined 
(Cumming and MacIntosh 2007).   
This chapter describes and analyzes how a stock exchange can be used to finance emerging 
companies and to assume the role usually played by private VCs. We find that this public VC 
market has a success rate which is approximately four times the corresponding rate for private 
VC. The public VC market provides approximately seven times as many new listings to the main 
market as private VCs. For a five-year horizon, the delisting rate of newly listed companies is 
much lower than the failure rate observed for the private VC sector in Canada. Finally, the 
comparison of the returns shows that the public VC market outperforms the private one. We 
conclude that a public VC market is indeed able to compete with a private one, even if it does not 
have the tools, skills and value added capabilities usually attributed to private VCs 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the following section, we analyze the public 
VC market from a conceptual perspective and evidence the large differences between the public 
and the private approach to VC. The various mechanisms new firms use to enter the TSXV and to 
raise successive financings are described in Section 3. We also summarize, in this section, the 
main characteristics of the newly listed companies. In Section 4, we study the results of this 
experimentation, both in terms of failures and successes (graduation to the main exchange). In 
Section 5, we compare the rate of return of the public and the private VC markets in Canada. The 
last section is devoted to discussion of the lessons of the Canadian experimentation in terms of 
regulation, public policy and financing strategy for growing firms.   
DESCRIPTION AND CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION 
The Canadian stock market and venture capital market 
In Canada, nascent companies wishing to obtain equity finance after the seed money stage of 
development can choose between two paths, as illustrated in Figure 1. The first option is to turn 
to the Canadian classic VC market, which is generally considered the third largest in the world in 
terms of available funds. The second path is the TSXV, the public VC market. At the entrance, 
  2subsequent rounds of financing and exit stages, both markets present similarities. Newly created 
companies with no history or sales are allowed to list on the TSXV because of very lenient listing 
requirements. They can enter the market using a Reverse Merger (RM) on a public shell, an IPO 
or a Capital Pool Company (CPC). The CPC program has been implemented in Canada as a 
clone of the U.S. blind pool program, to help emerging companies access the stock market. 
Similar to the classic VC market, the TSXV offers several equity financing avenues. In both 
markets, investors can provide subsequent rounds of financing. Private placements are also 
commonly used by the TSXV listed companies. Lastly, just as the most profitable exit for classic 
VCs is an IPO, the objective of the TSXV is to graduate its best performers to the TSX.  
**Insert Figure 1 about here** 
In addition to the TSX and the TSXV, there are two secondary and more recently created 
markets: the NEX and the Canadian National Stock Exchange (CNSX).
1 There were 1,578 
issuers listed on the TSX and 2,261 issuers listed on the TSXV at November 30, 2008. The main 
market itself is equivalent to the London AIM in terms of characteristics of listed companies, and 
can be considered a market devoted to growing companies (Rousseau 2006). All but the largest 
245 companies on the TSX are small or micro capitalization companies according to Nicholls 
(2006, p.160). A leading law firm in the country considers that the AIM and the TSX offer “a 
real exit for mature companies not ready for the pros.”
2 The TSXV aims to feed this market. 
This creates an original situation where a junior market is fed by a public VC market whereas in 
most countries, the conventional VC market is the natural feeder of the junior exchange.  
The TSXV
3 calls itself a “public venture market.” Kevin Strong, the manager of the Winnipeg 
Office of the TSXV, describes this market as a “national market for publicly traded venture 
companies offering venture companies and their investors a quality, liquid and efficient 
                                                 
1 CNSX, formerly known as the Canadian Trading and Quotation System inc. (CNQ), listed 100 securities 
in November 2008 (see: www.cnsx.ca). NEX is a separate trading board of TSXV where firms that do not 
fulfill the ongoing listing requirements are moved. According to NEX’s website: “NEX issuers have the 
opportunity to refinance, reactivate or reinvent themselves in order to re-apply to TSX Venture Exchange 
provided they can evidence their compliance with TSX Venture Listing Requirements.” 
2 See Eric M Levy, Heenan Blaikie LLP, Alternative Capital Markets for U.S. Issuers: TSX and AIM, at 
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL650000pub/materials/goingpublic.pdf
3 We use the term TSXV to refer to this exchange and its predecessors. In 2001 the TSX Group acquired 
and renamed the Canadian Venture Exchange (CDNX), previously created by the merger, in 1999, of the 
Alberta and Vancouver Exchanges. In 2001, the Montreal Exchange opted to specialize in derivatives, and 
transferred its small capitalization securities to the CDNX.  
  3environment for capital raising and investing,” and “a fully-regulated national stock exchange 
that exists to improve access to capital and provide public company experience and mentorship 
to emerging companies prior to graduation to a senior stock exchange.” Notably, the TSXV aims 
to provide the management of newly public companies with mentoring and streamlined 
graduation to the TSX.
4 This exchange has very low initial and ongoing listing requirements. 
New companies can list with no revenues. Their stock price should be higher than CAN$0.15, 
and their minimum net tangible assets, including the IPO proceeds, have been set at 
CAN$500,000 or CAN$750,000 depending on the period.
5 If we apply the definitions of small 
and micro caps stated by the Advisory Committee on Smaller Companies (SEC 2006), about 
98% of the TSXV companies could be considered micro capitalization companies (Nicholls 
2006). The TSXV lists a large number of resources companies, a sector in which VC 
involvement is traditionally low. It is generally assumed that over 50% of the world’s traded 
mining companies are listed on one of the two main Canadian Exchanges, and resources 
companies represent approximately 50% of the new listings on the TSXV. In this sector, the 
listing requirements are minimal. For a Tier 2 listing, an Exploration Company should have spent 
at least CAN$100,000 in the past three years, must have geologic merit and a planned work 
program valued at CAN$200,000 or more. At the time of listing, the company must have 
sufficient funds to carry out the planned work program plus meet all required property or option 
payments and general and administrative costs for 12 months. No requirements apply to net 
tangible assets. 
The consequences of these very low listing requirements are illustrated in Table 1, where we 
report the distribution of stock prices and market capitalization at the end of 2006. Accordingly, 
this table illustrates that more than 82.07% (97.79%) of TSXV-listed stocks trade at prices lower 
than one (five) dollars, and 80.53% of TSXV firms have a market capitalization lower than 
CAN$30 million. 
**Insert Table 1 about here** 
The large relative weight of resources companies is probably a partial explanation for the growth 
of this public VC market in Canada. Classic VCs generally do not invest in natural resources, and 
                                                 
4 See http://www.tsx.com/en/pdf/TSXVentureSuccessStories.pdf 
5 To list on NASDAQ from June 1999 to June 2001, a company had to post a stock price higher than 
US$4, shareholders’ equity of US$4 million and market capitalization of US$5 million at least. 
  4the public market could be required to obviate the lack of equity financing for this sector. 
However, the Canadian situation can also be attributed to the inefficiency of the conventional VC 
market, largely influenced by public policies promoting poorly designed Labour-Sponsored VC 
funds (Cumming and MacIntosh 2006; Cumming and MacIntosh 2007). In consequence, the 
stock market has been largely used as a substitute for the VC market. As Cumming (2006, p.221) 
notes, “the comparatively lower quality of Canada’s VC market gives rise to a need for Canadian 
companies to access public capital markets earlier than their counterparts in the U.S.”. In 
Canada, new business financing provided by the public VC market has largely exceeded that 
provided by the private market since 2002, as illustrated in Figure 2.  
**Insert Figure 2 about here** 
Most of the theoretical research devoted to venture capitalists (VCs) concludes that a public VC 
market could not succeed in the long run.  The next section explains why.  
Why a public VC market should not succeed  
Several theoretical arguments assert that the development of new ventures through a stock market 
is not feasible, consistent with the evidence provided by experimentation with new markets in 
Europe. A stock market and individual investors have neither the tools nor the capacity to resolve 
the agency and asymmetric information problems associated with new and growing businesses. 
As Amit et al. (1998) posits, information asymmetries are the key to understanding the VC 
industry. To circumvent these asymmetries, VCs have developed particular tools and methods, 
which are briefly presented in Table 2 along with the equivalent (if any) in the public VC market.  
The first, and perhaps most significant, difference between the private and the public market lies 
in the screening of venture projects. A stock market with listing requirements based on minimal 
quantitative benchmarks cannot perform a due diligence review of listing candidates. All firms 
fulfilling the minimal listing requirements can list on the TSXV, while the VCs generally finance 
a very low proportion of the projects they analyze. VCs choose a project following a thorough 
due diligence process concerning the various dimensions of the venture, including its 
management and the market for the product or service. A second important difference between 
the public and the private market is the use, by the latter, of incentive contracts and specially 
designed securities. These tools serve to control agency problems and associated risks. The 
public venture market has only conventional stocks and warrants at its disposal. Private VCs are 
  5presumed to provide value added services in several areas of firms’ activities. The public market 
cannot provide these services, and the sponsor’s role is limited to ascertaining that the firm is 
suitable for the market. Moreover, in several cases, the sponsor is not involved in the listing 
process. The stock exchange exempts an issuer from the sponsorship requirements when it raises 
an IPO and the prospectus is executed by at least one member of the exchange, and, since the 
2002 revision of the TSXV policy, a CPC is no longer required to retain a sponsor for an IPO, 
provided that it has an agent sign the CPC prospectus as an underwriter.
6  
**Insert Table 2 about here** 
One can argue that firms that opt for the public venture market cannot benefit from value added 
activities usually provided by VC. Further, firms financed by the public VC market are likely to 
reach the main market under less favorable conditions than companies backed by VCs. These 
VCs spend considerable time monitoring firm management before the IPO (Gompers 1995) 
because they have incentives to set strong governance structures in their portfolio firms 
(Hochberg 2006); this is known as the “monitoring effect.” Moreover, as underlined by Lerner 
(1995) and by Barry et al. (1990), VCs frequently retain a seat on the newly listed firm’s board 
even after cashing out. Lerner argues that it might be expected that these firms will experience 
fewer agency problems because VCs are specialized providers of oversight. VCs have strong 
incentives to set optimal governance systems before their portfolio firm goes public, because 
their returns depend on the share price when the lockup rules permit them to sell their stake. This 
is called the “oversight effect.” Finally, Chemmanur and Loutskina (2006) evidence a “market 
power effect.” VCs develop long-term relationships with participants in the IPO market, e.g. 
underwriters, institutional investors and analysts. These relationships increase the participation by 
these market players in the IPOs.   
The comparison between the tools, resources and skills of a private and a public market for VC 
illustrates that only the former can resolve the asymmetry, risk and agency problems that prevail 
in the financing of new ventures. As Korcsmaros (2002, p.4) maintains, “the jury is still out on 
the accomplishments attained by stock exchanges dedicated to serving SMEs and the extent to 
which they have been successful in bringing SMEs to the capital market.” There is support for the 
notion that, especially for emerging economies, stock exchanges are particularly relevant to help 
                                                 
6 http://www.tsx.com/en/pdf/ManualUpdateAug-2002.pdf
  6medium-sized indigenous firms gain access to finance and promote local market development. 
However, there are specific doubts regarding the suitability of financing emerging ventures 




The Penny Stock IPO Process  
In the U.S., several regulatory changes strongly restrict the issuing of penny stock IPOs. The 
Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 (PSRA) was mainly an attempt to curb fraudulent security 
issues by placing severe restrictions on IPOs priced below $5. As evidenced by Bradley et al. 
(2006), penny stock IPOs are rare in the U.S. From 1990 to 1998, these authors mention 251 
penny stock IPOs and 2,707 ordinary IPOs. However, the gross proceeds of the penny stocks of 
their sample ($5.7 million) are approximately four times those reported in Canada during the 
same period. This illustrates the distinctive situation of the stock market in Canada. This situation 
prevails because the Canadian and U.S. stock exchanges and regulators have followed opposite 
paths. In Canada, there are no requirements for minimum stock price, and companies are allowed 
to list at a pre-revenue stage, with minimal shareholders’ equity and prices generally lower than 
one Canadian dollar. 
The initial listing requirements changed several times over the years, and vary by sector. As a 
result, characterization of the newly listed companies illustrates the requirements more clearly 
than the list of criteria would. For the last twenty years, the median issue price, pre-issue 
shareholders’ equity and gross proceeds were CAN$0.75, CAN$180,000 and CAN$550,000 
respectively. Almost 59% of issuers report no revenues and 84% report negative earnings. The 
majority of Canadian IPOs can be considered penny stock IPOs, while in most countries, minimal 
listing requirements exclude micro-capitalization and start-up companies from the market. 
However, consistent with the arguments of several practitioners and academics that the listing 
rules are too restrictive, alternative listing modes have been developed and actively promoted by 
the exchanges. They include the RM listing method and the use of the CPC Program.  
  7Reverse Mergers  
An RM listing is a merger between a public shell company, generally inactive, and the target, a 
privately held company. The shell generally has a very low market value.  For the illustration 
presented in Figure 3, we use a value of CAN$1 million, comprised of 5 million shares priced at 
CAN$0.20. Operating closed firms that seek listing generally have a much higher value: for 
illustration purposes, we attribute to such a firm a value of 10 million shares priced at CAN$10. 
The resulting company, which we name Mergeco, results from the merger of the two former 
firms. The merger entails an exchange of shares, and a private placement is often raised. Because 
of the difference in value between the shell and the operating company, the shareholders of the 
operating company acquire the majority of the shares of the resulting entity. These shareholders 
ultimately control the public shell company, which is why this transaction is called a Reverse 
merger. RMs take place in the exempt market: this means that newly listed companies are exempt 
from filing a prospectus and need not comply with the registration requirements prevailing for 
IPOs.
7 Moreover, during an RM, the company cannot issue equity publicly, because these 
transactions are not considered public offerings and are not associated with the approval of a 
prospectus by the authorities. As a result, the private company becomes public by buying the 
shell and does not need to issue a prospectus, sell new shares to the public or meet the minimum 
listing requirements.  
**Insert Figure 3 about here** 
The frequency of RM is constrained by the availability of shells. “Classic” shells are once active 
companies that failed to develop and ceased or strongly reduced their activities. They are mostly 
NEX listed companies that could not meet the ongoing listing requirements of the other 
exchanges. “Manufactured” shells are created specifically from zero, using the CPC program.  
The CPC Program 
The first Junior Capital Pool program was launched in Alberta at the end of 1986. This program 
was an adaptation of the U.S. Blind Pool (Blank Check Company, BCC) program. In 1997, a 
similar program was adopted in British Columbia. The CPC program replaced the two previous 
programs following the merger of the Vancouver and Alberta Stock Exchanges in November 
                                                 
7 The disclosure requirements for these transactions vary over time and between provinces. In 2005, the 
exchange modified the policy to require prospectus-like disclosure 
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program is a two-stage process. The first stage involves the completion of the IPO and the listing 
of the CPC on the exchange. The CPC is a listed corporation with no assets or business plan, no 
operating history, and no assets except cash. Its sole goal is to find and acquire assets or 
companies as takeover targets. The second stage involves an agreement in principle relative to a 
qualifying transaction. Once this transaction is completed, the new entity must satisfy the 
exchange’s minimum listing requirements for the particular industrial sector. The resulting issuer 
(RI) may be listed for regular trading either in Tier 1 or Tier 2. In the U.S., BCCs commonly used 
in the ‘80s as shells have been severely restricted by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), which enacted Rule 419 in 1992, designed to protect investors against fraud in RM 
transactions (Feldman 2006 Chap 4). However, creative lawyers developed the Special Purpose 
Acquisition Company (“SPAC”)
8 to work around the new regulations without defeating the 
regulations’ purpose of investor protection (Heyman 2007).  
A picture of the new listings  
In Table 3, we report the main characteristics of the firms that have accessed the TSXV during 
the last two decades, by sub-period and by type of listing method. These firms are micro-
capitalization corporations: their pre-money shareholders’ equity is approximately 
CAN$300,000. The listing does not coincide with collection of significant amounts of cash. If we 
consider the private placements occurring during RM as the equivalent of the IPO’s gross 
proceeds, we get a median (mean) gross proceeds of CAN$650,000 (CAN$2 million) for all new 
listings. Moreover, 80.14% of newly listed firms report negative earnings at the listing time, and 
close to 50% of companies access the market at a pre-revenue stage. These issuers have median 
assets of CAN$0.71 million. There are only slight differences between the companies, depending 
on the listing mode. The median shareholders’ equity is larger for RMs (CAN$710,000) than for 
IPOs (CAN$180,000) and RIs of CPCs (CAN$320,000). The proportion of companies reporting 
no revenues (earnings) at the listing time ranges from 30% (72%) for RIs of CPCs to 59% (84%) 
                                                 
8 An SPAC is a company that has no specific business plan or purpose or has indicated that its business 
plan is to engage in a merger or acquisition with an unidentified company or companies, other entity, or 
person within a specified time period, typically within a span of eighteen months, according to the SEC. 
These companies are “development stage companies.” There are considerable differences between BBC 
and SPACs in terms of regulation, size and the number of shareholders. The average proceeds of the 62 
IPOs of SPACs analyzed by Jog and Sun (2007) during the 2003-2006 period are US$65 million, an 
amount which is unrelated to those found in the CPC program.  
  9for IPOs. Overall, the operational characteristics of firms financed through the TSXV resemble 
those of firms that can be financed by early stage private VCs.  
A very large proportion (more than 48%) of newly listed companies specialize in natural 
resources, including energy and mining. The proportion of technological firms (19.29%) appears 
low compared with the proportion of such investment by VCs in the U.S., which is generally 
between 80% and 90%.
9 However, Brander et al. (2008) report that 33% of private VC investees 
are in technology sectors in Canada.  The focus of VC thus differs sharply between the two 
countries. 
According to Baygan (2003), in 2001, deals valued at CAN$5 million and above represented 
about 80% of all Canadian VC transactions, and the average deal size reached CAN$4.5 million 
at the beginning of the ‘00s. Similar figures are provided by Industry Canada: the average deal 
size in VC reached CAN$3.0 million in 2002, after peaking at CAN$4.3 million in 2000—a 72-
percent increase from the CAN$1.8 million average in 1996 (Industry Canada 2002). 
Accordingly, the median proceeds raised by newly listed Canadian companies (CAN$0.65 
million) are significantly lower than the average deal in the Canadian VC market. The TSXV 
indeed competes with the early stage component of the VC market, but the TSXV new listings 
are even smaller than the firms financed by private VCs. By summing the gross proceeds and the 
pre-money shareholders’ equity, we estimate the median post-money shareholders’ equity at 
CAN$1 million. 
**Insert Table 3 about here** 
Subsequent financing rounds 
In the conventional VC market, staging is a current practice and the financed companies are 
provided with successive financing rounds. The situation is similar in the public VC market, 
where the listed companies issue a large number of private placements and subsequent public 
offerings. Most of these financing rounds occur when the companies do not report positive 
earnings or even sales. Table 4 summarizes the financing activity of firms that list on the TSXV 
between 1993 and 2006. A surprising result is that a large proportion of the firms analyzed had 
no financing activity following the listing. 39.38% of the IPOs issue neither private nor public 
                                                 
9 From PWC data at: http://www.pwcmoneytree.com/moneytree/nav.jsp?page=notice&iden=B
  10equity. The same situation prevails for RMs (44.26%) and RIs of CPCs (46.10%). The reasons 
such companies list are unclear, but growth financing does not seem to be among them. The most 
plausible explanation is that a large proportion of newly listed companies do not fulfill the 
minimal conditions required to secure private or public outside equity.  
Based on an extensive analysis of 3,720 private VC investments from 1996 to 2004, Brander et 
al. (2008 note 10, p.12) report that “as of five years after first investment, about 10% of venture-
supported enterprises have an IPO, about 25% are acquired by a third party, about 45% go out 
of business, and the remainder either experience another type of venture capital exit or simply 
continue as a venture-supported privately held enterprise.” The proportion of TSXV newly listed 
companies that do not get subsequent rounds of financing is in the same range as the failure rate 
observed in the private VC market. 
Following listing, a large proportion of firms (32%) issue private placements exclusively. Our 
analysis of these private placements indicates that they are essentially provided by individual 
investors. This is a puzzling result, especially for the backdoor new listings. Indeed, if these firms 
do not raise public offerings, they will never create a public market for their shares, and their 
stock liquidity will be low. One of the main advantages of a public listing is the decrease in the 
cost of equity through the creation of a liquid market for shares. Our analysis shows that the firms 
listed on the TSXV are not actively seeking this advantage. 
The total financing obtained by the 854 firms involved in private placements is low: CAN$15.8 
billion or CAN$18.5 million over an average time frame of 10 years. Only 25.41% of the newly 
listed firms get financing through a subsequent public offering. The mean time to raise this 
financing is approximately 17 months after the listing date. The median time ranges from 6 
months for CPCs to 13 months for IPOs. Overall, a small sub-sample of firms (7.49%) obtained 4 
financings or more, but they raise 41.48% of the total gross proceeds. From the financing strategy 
standpoint, firms that choose the public market exhibit a pattern of staged finance similar to the 
one observed in the private market. 
**Insert Table 4 about here** 
  11PERFORMANCE OF THE PUBLIC VENTURE MARKET IN DEVELOPING NEW 
VENTURES 
The performance of a venture market can be measured in several ways. We focus on the 
following dimensions.
10 First, we analyze the failure--or delisting--rate of new listings. Second, 
we study the success rate of the same listings. For VCs, the most successful exit is the IPO. In 
Canada, Brander et al. (2008, p.18) consider that the IPO market is divided into two segments: 
“the senior exchanges (TSX), which signal that an enterprise has achieved a certain maturity and 
viability, and the junior exchanges, which do not guarantee either maturity or viability of the 
enterprise.”  We then compare the rate of VC-backed IPOs on the TSX with the rate of 
graduation from the TSXV to the same main market. A third pertinent dimension is the rate of 
return investors earn.  
Definition and Measures 
Delisting 
In Canada, the delisting rules have allowed securities to stay listed for a very long period, even if 
they are traded at a very low price or not at all. For example, in December 2001, 313 stocks listed 
on the TSXV had prices equal to 3 cents or less. Several of these stocks have been used as shell 
companies during an RM listing. Before the creation of the NEX in 2003, companies falling 
below TSXV's ongoing listing standards were designated inactive and given 18 months to meet 
the standards or be delisted. However, the delisting is not systematic; the stock exchange uses 
flexibility and discretion in applying the rules.
11 The ongoing listing standards to Tier 2 of the 
junior market refer to a minimal market capitalization of CAN$100,000 (in 2007), minimal 
working capital of CAN$50,000 and significant operating revenues in the previous 12 months; or 
at least CAN$100,000 in expenditures directly related to the development of assets in the 
                                                 
10 This section of the chapter draws upon the papers by Carpentier and Suret (2008) and Carpentier et al. 
(2008) 
11 According to the TSX Manual (2007, policy 2.5, p.3) “If an Issuer has a viable business although it 
does not meet certain elements of the Tier 2 TMR, the Exchange may determine that it is not appropriate 
to transfer the Issuer to NEX. The Exchange will consider the seasonal or other cycles which affect an 
Issuer’s business. If an Issuer’s Working Capital is low because of seasonal or other temporary 
conditions, the Exchange may delay enforcement of this Policy but will continue to monitor the Issuer.”  
  12previous 12 months. No conditions apply to the stock price. By comparison, similar limits for the 
NASDAQ are $5 million for market capitalization and $1 for the stock price, under standard 1.
12  
To be able to estimate a failure rate, we applied a rule which mimics the NASDAQ delisting 
practice as well as the decision criteria used by Demers and Joos (2007), among others. We 
consider as “dead” any stock that maintains a price lower than CAN$0.10 for seven consecutive 
months. We use the 10-cent limit given that Canadian IPO prices are on average one tenth of 
prices in the U.S.
13 This rule affects approximately 10% of newly listed companies, yet in many 
cases, the application of the rule has the sole effect of producing a delisting rule that is earlier 
than the date reported by the exchanges. We also consider as non-surviving a stock which is used 
as a shell for an RM, all companies whose stocks were delisted by the exchange, or subject to an 
issuer cease trade order at the time of the analysis, failed companies that are not yet delisted, and 
those whose stocks are only traded OTC or NEX. 
Mergers and acquisitions 
In the case of mergers, we assume that the resulting company is a continuation of the issuer. The 
issuer status is then one of a merged company. In the case of acquisitions, we collected the 
acquisition price per share (including the value of share exchanges) and qualified as failures the 
cases where the acquisition price is lower than CAN$0.10.  
Success 
The TSXV considers that a company succeeds if it graduates to the main Canadian market. To 
graduate, TSXV listed companies have to comply with the TSX minimal listing requirements. 
Even if these requirements are higher than those prevailing on the TSXV, they appear to be very 
low relative to international standards. In 1998, the TSX introduced the “technology company 
standards,” which required that companies have a minimum of CAN$12 million in treasury, 
adequate funds to cover all planned research and development (R&D) expenditures, general and 
administrative expenses and capital expenditures for a period of at least two years and a 
minimum two-year operating history that included R&D activities. Accordingly, these listing 
standards allow developing companies to access the market easily while reporting negative 
                                                 
12 According to the Listing Standard and Fees document, available on the NASDAQ site (last visited 
January 15, 2009, at http://www.nasdaq.com/about/nasdaq_listing_req_fees.pdf
13 Demers and Joos (2007) report a mean and median issue price in the vicinity of US$15 to US$16. The 
corresponding value is US$2 (CAN$3). 
  13earnings, even at a pre-revenue stage of development.
14 For mineral exploration and 
development-stage companies, the only quantified requirements are working capital of at least 
CAN$2 million and net tangible assets of CAN$3 million. For industrial companies “forecasting 
profitability,” the TSX requires net tangible assets of CAN$7.5 million and evidence (satisfactory 
to the TSX) of earnings from ongoing operations for the current or next fiscal year of at least 
CAN$200,000.  
As its website states, the TSXV promotes the migration of growing companies, which it strives to 
help graduate from the TSXV to the TSX “in a more efficient and economical manner than ever 
before (…) Once a company has gained the skills necessary to operate successfully as a public 
venture and built a solid financial foundation, it's possible to graduate to a senior exchange such 
as TSX.” The TSXV proposes the following benefits for graduation:
15 1) TSX listing application 
fee will be waived for eligible TSXV issuers; 2) certain issuer information on file with TSXV can 
be accessed by the TSX; 3) sponsorship requirements may be waived for qualified TSXV issuers; 
and 4) a business development service helps the company in the graduation process. Graduations 
are proudly highlighted on the website. The opportunity to graduate is a central argument in the 
promotion of actions organized by the exchange to attract new listings.
16  
The results of the Public VC Market 
An extensive data collection process enabled us to establish the status of 3,430 of the 3,857 
newly listed firms included in the initial sample (88.93%). The missing observations mostly 
concern firms that list at the beginning of our period of analysis for which no data are 
subsequently available. A status of failure is probably the best guess for these firms. Table 5 
presents the distribution of the status by cohort and by listing method. We group RMs and RIs of 
CPCs (backdoor listings) because we do not observe material differences between these two 
categories in terms of evolution and status.  
                                                 
14 See Harris (2006) for an analysis of this change in the listing requirements, and more generally of the 
listing standards in Canada.   
15 See http://www.tsx.com/en/listings/venture_issuer_resources/graduation_to_tsx/index.html. 
16 The TSXV organizes “Accessing Public Venture Capital Workshops” that “go beyond the basics of 
public venture capital and delivers compelling, first person perspectives on public financing, building 
your business and sustaining growth. And it provides access to leading public venture capital experts—
investment bankers, lawyers, auditors and TSX Venture professionals.” The cases of graduating 
companies are presented as success stories (http://www.tsx.com/en/pdf/TSXVentureSuccessStories.pdf). 
  14Overall, Panel A shows that, at the end of the study period, non-surviving issuers represent 
51.98% of the sample. The success rate (graduation or cross-listing) is 7.67% for the whole 
period. A proportion of 40.34% of issuers remains listed, but they do not graduate to a higher 
exchange. Therefore, in the long-run, approximately 5 out of 10 new issuers in Canada fail, 1 
succeeds and 4 survive but do not progress. The failure rate of IPOs is slightly higher than the 
rate observed for the firms that use a backdoor listing method (56.91% versus 46.77%) and the 
success rate is also lower for the first group (6.76% versus 8.64%). This can indicate that IPO 
firms are, on average, of lower quality than the firms that use the backdoor listing method. 
However, no definitive conclusion can be reached without carefully controlling for sector and 
size of newly listed companies.   
Panel C of Table 5 allows a comparison with the results of previous studies, where failure and 
survival rates are generally estimated after three, four and five years. The proportion of non-
surviving firms thus falls to 23.12%. Three U.S. studies deal specifically with penny stocks, 
comparable to, albeit larger than Canadian IPOs. Weber and Willenborg (2003) report a delisting 
rate of 25.3% after 4 years, Bradley et al. (2006) a rate of 31.5% after 3 years, and Dalbor and 
Sullivan (2005) estimate the failure rate at 44%. In a recent paper, Espenlaub et al. (2008) 
estimate the delisting rate at 21.68% after only two years for newly listed companies on the AIM. 
Despite listing requirements that are significantly more permissive than in the U.S. and even the 
fact that a large proportion of new issuers report no sales, the survival rate of new issuers in 
Canada after about five years seems to be lower or in the same range as the rate observed in other 
countries. This situation can probably be explained by the capacity of developing listed firms to 
issue private or public equity, even with negative earnings or no revenues, which would allow 
emerging firms to finance their growth. Moreover, the failure rate observed on a 5-year horizon is 
lower than the rate reported by Brander at al. (2008 note 10, p.12) for the Canadian private equity 
market; they estimate that, at five years after first investment, about 45% of venture-supported 
enterprises go out of business. According to this statistic, the rate of mortality of newly financed 
firms is lower for the TSXV than for the private VC market. 
Panel B of Table 5 allows a comparison with the few studies that report failure rates over a long 
horizon (e.g. Fama and French 2004). The table shows that 41.85% of the new listings did not 
survive after 10 years. This rate is lower than the rate reported by Henser et al. (1997) for the 
same time horizon (55.1%). It is also consistent with the one reported by Fama and French (2004) 
  15for their IPO issuers whose assets are below those of the median NYSE firm, but the size of these 
NASDAQ-listed companies is much larger than that of firms observed on the TSXV. Albeit 
much smaller and less mature than their U.S. equivalents, Canadian newly listed companies 
exhibit a similar or higher survival rate. 
We report, in Table 5, the failure rates by cohort of newly listed companies, for each listing 
mode. This value indicates the extent to which the failure rate is increasing, as asserted in the 
U.S. by Fama and French (2004). After five years (Panel C), the rate of failure increases sharply 
for IPOs, from 15.81% to 29.73% for the 1998-2002 cohort. This failure rate also increases for 
backdoor listings and, overall, the proportion of failure at five years has doubled from the end of 
the ‘80s to the beginning of the 2000s. The examination of the failure rate after ten years does not 
evidence a similar pattern. For all the new listings, the rate increases from 38.08% to 41.85%. 
This rate of failure increases slightly for IPOs and decreases for backdoor listings. The large 
increase in failure that we observe for the five year horizon is partially attributable to listing of 
emerging firms in the sector of internet and technologies. However, this phenomenon is not a 
fully satisfactory explanation, given that the failure rate increases for firms listed during the 
previous sub-period.  
We report, in the rightmost column of Table 5, the number of newly listed companies that 
graduate to the TSX by entry mode. For IPOs, the average graduation rate is 6.76% (Panel A):
 
only 134 of the 1,982 IPOs of the period graduate. The proportion is 8.64% for backdoor listings 
(162 graduations per 1,875 listings). Overall, the success rate of the TSXV is 7.67%. Comparable 
statistics are provided by Brander et al. (2008) for the conventional VC market, after an extensive 
survey of all the VC investments in Canada over the 1996-2004 period. They examine 3,720 VC-
backed firms, and show that 115 of these firms subsequently raise an IPO, 68 of which are 
followed by listing on a main exchange and 47 on the TSXV. The success rate reported by 
Brander et al. for the conventional VC market is thus a meager 3.1% for the population. The rate 
decreases to 1.8% if we consider IPOs on the TSX only. By comparison, the rate we estimate for 
the VC stock market is 7.67%. Although we cannot test the significance of this difference using 
the available data, the public venture market in Canada seems to provide a graduation rate for 
TSXV listed companies that is approximately four times the exit rate by IPOs on the main market 
estimated for VCs   
**Insert Table 5 about here** 
  16THE PERFORMANCE OF THE PUBLIC VENTURE MARKET: THE INVESTOR’S 
PERSPECTIVE 
Comparing the returns of a VC and a public market is a challenging task. VC returns are internal 
rates of return. The comparison with the classic rates of return of indexes cannot be based on 
statistical tests. Moreover, in Canada, indexes are available only from 1995 to 2005.  The 
estimation of returns for the TSXV is also problematic, because this market results from the 
merger of several markets. The S&P TSXV index was created in 2002. Previously, a CDNX 
index was available since 1999. Before that time, the venture market was composed of several 
entities, each with their own index. As a result, we cannot use the official indexes for a long-term 
analysis. Moreover, the S&P TSXV index does not include newly listed companies. For these 
reasons, our analysis cannot provide a definitive conclusion on the relative performance of both 
markets. Nonetheless, the results are striking. Table 6 reports the value-weighted returns of an 
index of new listings on the public VC market. We use all the stocks that list on the TSXV or its 
predecessors, from their listing date. The new listings include IPOs, RMs and RIs of CPCs. The 
weights are based on the market capitalization at the beginning of each month.
17 For comparison 
purposes, we report 1) statistics on the return distribution of the TSX for the same period, 2) the 
official index returns for both markets, from 2001 to 2006 and 3) the new listings’ return for the 
1995-2005 period, for a comparison with the conventional VC market’s return.  
Our first observation is that the TSXV outperforms the main market. The newly listed firm index 
posts an average rate of return of 15.69%, while the return of the main market was 10.70%. 
Nonetheless, the standard deviation is 35.40% for the former market vs. 14.34% for the latter 
one. We get similar results when the official indexes are used. Note that this market is highly 
volatile and illiquid, and is dominated by small and growth stocks. The TSXV probably does not 
compensate investors adequately for the various forms of risk associated with the ownership of 
small and growth stocks. 
The second observation is that the public VC market outperforms the private one considerably. 
From June 1995 to June 2005, the private VC industry reports a meager net annual internal rate 
                                                 
17 To limit the influence of the outliers, we set the maximum monthly return to 1000% (roughly 0.03% of 
the distribution). The equally weighted index is largely influenced by the spectacular returns of several 
very small stocks, which soar from 1 to 10 cents. Consequently, we report and discuss the value-weighted 
returns exclusively. 
  17of return of -3%.
18 The net annual rates of return are in the same range for early stage VC          (-
3.4%), balanced VC (-2.8%) and later stage VC (-3.3%). During the same period of time, the new 
listings index posts an 11.96% annual rate of return. The VC market’s performance is abnormally 
low in Canada relative to the U.S., which reports an annual return of 27.6% for the same period, 
according to the Canadian Venture Capital Association (CVCA). The difference between the 
returns of the public and private venture markets is economically very large, but we cannot assess 
its statistical significance because the two returns are not estimated the same way. 
This unexpected result contradicts the proposition that conventional VCs benefit from significant 
advantages in financing new ventures. In Canada, the public VC market outperformed the private 
one. One explanation for this is that the reported VC return is abnormally low, because it includes 
the very poor return of Labour-Sponsored VC Funds, which receive large tax subsidies but suffer 
from poor governance (Cumming and MacIntosh 2006). According to this explanation, during 
the studied period the larger players in the VC market have not demonstrated the capacity and 
skill usually attributed to private VCs. A second explanation could be that the TSXV is heavily 
exposed to the natural resources sector, while the VC is not. Nonetheless, excluding this sector 
does not change the conclusion, since the difference between the public and the private market 
return is still higher than 1000 basis points per year (Carpentier et al. 2008). A third explanation 
for the observed difference could be a competition effect. With quicker and lighter procedures 
(mainly in the case of RMs) the TSXV may have captured a significant market share of 
promising companies usually oriented toward traditional VC. We left the test of these 
propositions for further research.  
**Insert Table 6 about here** 
CONCLUSION 
This paper describes and analyzes how a stock exchange can be used to finance emerging 
companies and to assume the role usually played by private VCs. Our analysis of the population 
of new listings in the Canadian venture stock market--the TSXV--during the 1986-2006 period 
                                                 
18 See Canadian VC & Private Equity Industry Performance data, online on the site of Reseau Capital (the 
Quebec VC and Private Equity Association), last visited January 15, 2009, at: 
http://www.reseaucapital.com/Statistiques/Stat2005/Performance%20Study%20June%202005.pdf
The performance of the US VC industry is also available (last visited January 15, 2009) at:  
http://www.reseaucapital.com/Statistiques/Stat2006/2006_Q4_ForumCanada-France.pdf
  18illustrates the openness of this market to early stage companies. The size and the gross proceeds 
of newly listed companies are generally lower than those reported for VC investments, and far 
less than those observed in the junior markets in Europe. The TSXV is indeed a public market for 
VC, which provides equity to early stage companies well before they reach the profitability stage, 
and even before they report revenues. 
Canada has developed a specific path to finance emerging firms, probably because of the poor 
performance of a VC market hampered by questionable public policies and minimally interested 
in small deals, combined with the steady rate of business creation in the natural resources sector, 
where VC involvement is typically low. The Canadian experience thus illustrates that a mode 
other than classic VC can provide businesses in the pre-profitability stage with equity. The 
question is whether such a tool can be economically viable. Several dimensions of this 
experimentation deserve attention.  
We measured the success rate of new entrants, and estimated the rate of failure/success. We then 
compared these data with data reported for traditional VCs, which usually consider an IPO to be a 
success. We find that the success rate of the public venture market is approximately four times 
the corresponding rate for traditional VC. This surprising result is not consistent with the lack of 
screening and monitoring by the venture stock exchange. However, the public venture market 
admits more new firms than the VC market usually does, and seems to accept companies at an 
earlier development stage. The bottom line is that during the period under analysis, the ratio of 
graduations to the total sample of VC-backed IPOs is approximately seven to one.  
For a horizon of five years, the delisting rate of newly listed companies is lower than the one 
reported in the U.S., and much lower than the failure rate observed for the private VC sector in 
Canada. This result is surprising because of the apparently poor quality of the new issuers on the 
public market and the lack of value added activity usually associated with conventional VC 
providers. In particular, the delisting rate is much lower than the failure rate of 45% reported 
during 1996-2004 by Brander et al. (2008) for private VCs. This situation is probably attributable 
to two factors. First, a Canadian company can easily issue private or public equity, even if it has 
not reached the profitability or even the sales stage. In this sense, the Canadian seasoned equity 
market contrasts sharply with the U.S. market. The second explanation is the tolerance of the 
exchange for delisting of non-operating companies. The exchange is probably less prone to delist 
  19than VCs are to write off. Nevertheless, the observation that a public market devoted to early 
stage companies exhibits a lower failure rate than the private VC market is not in line with the 
theoretical literature, which gives private VC a strong advantage in financing new ventures. In 
the same vein, the observation that the rate of return of a public VC market can surpass that of a 
private VC market, in the same country, is another unexpected result. Further research is needed 
to determine if the poor performance of the Canadian VC market is linked to the existence of the 
public VC market, and to what extent these markets are competing with each other. In any case, 
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Table 1: Main characteristics of TSXV-listed companies at the end of December 2006, according 
to the TSXV Review. Stocks not traded during the year are set to 0. Panel A reports the stock 
price distribution in Canadian dollars. Panel B reports the market capitalization in CAN$ million.   
 
 Frequency  Relative  frequency %  Cumulative frequency % 
Panel A: Stock Prices, in Canadian dollars ($) 
$0   51  2.39  2.39 
$0.05 92  4.32  6.71 
$0.1 165  7.74  14.45 
$0.2 418  19.62  34.07 
$0.3 274  12.86  46.93 
$0.4 201  9.43  56.36 
$0.5 152  7.13  63.49 
$0.75 247  11.59  75.08 
$1 149  6.99  82.07 
$1.5 139  6.52  88.60 
$5 196  9.20  97.79 
$10 32  1.50  99.30 
More than $10  15  0.70  100.00 
Total 2,131  100.00  
Panel B: Market Capitalizations, in CAN$ million ($M)  
$0 M  51  2.39  2.39 
$1 M  152  7.13  9.53 
$2 M  182  8.54  18.07 
$5 M  362  16.99  35.05 
$10 M  368  17.27  52.32 
$15 M  230  10.79  63.12 
$20 M  169  7.93  71.05 
$30 M  202  9.48  80.53 
$50 M  159  7.46  87.99 
$100 M  146  6.85  94.84 
$500 M  100  4.69  99.53 
More than $500 M  10  0.47  100.00 
Total 2,131  100.00  200.00 
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Figure 2: Financing on TSXV compared with VC Disbursements, 2000-2005 
* TSX Venture figures include Resources (Mining and Oil & Gas) 
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Information 
collection 
VCs use due diligence process and 
their knowledge of the technologies 
and market to determine the value of 
the projects  
Prospectus if the listing is done via an IPO, 
Notice and minimal information when the 




Management experience is assessed  Officers, directors and holders of more than 
10% of a company’s voting securities 
complete information forms, allowing the 
TSXV to conduct background checks before 
approving a listing.  
Incentive 
contracts 
Generally used. Shareholders 
agreements adapted to the specific 
context   




Value added services in several 
areas of management, including 
strategy, marketing and finance.   
A participating organization can provide a 
sponsorship letter. Sponsors confirm 
whether the issuer satisfies the initial listing 
requirements and comment on the ability of 









VCs possess market power and 
knowledge of the IPO process. VCs 
remain involved in the newly listed 
firm, because the value they get 
from the IPO is determined by the 
stock price at the end of the lock-up 
period. 
Graduation toward a more senior exchange. 
The exchange provides technical help for 
graduation, but it has neither the motivation 
nor the resources to provide the graduating 
companies with the services usually 
provided by VC at the IPO exit time.    
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Figure 3: Illustration of the reverse merger listing method frequently used on the TSXV market 
 
Former shell's shareholders: 1/11=9.09%




1.1 M x $10
5 for 1 1 for 1
Shell   Operating company
MV: $1 M   MV: $10 M







  27Table 3: Main characteristics of 3,857 new listings on the TSXV during the 1986-2006 
period, by listing method.   
Type of listing 
Initial 
Public   Reverse  Resulting issuer   All new
   Offering  Merger  from CPC  listings
Number 1,982  825  1,050  3,857 
Mean Gross proceeds, in $M  1.61  2.94  2.36  2.08 
Median Gross proceeds, in $M  0.55  0.66  1.14  0.65 
Assets, in $M  0.54  1.60  0.80  0.71 
Shareholders' equity, in $M  0.18  0.71  0.32  0.26 
% of High Tech issuers  16.04  14.67  29.12  19.29 
% of Natural Resources issuers  55.55  41.58  39.27  48.14 
% of issuers without revenues at the issue 58.68  41.00  29.96  49.26 
% if issuers with negative EPS at the 
issue 83.57  77.84  72.33  80.14 
CPC means Capital Pool companies. Mean and median gross proceeds, assets and shareholders’ 
equity are in CAN$ million ($M). % means percentage. EPS means earnings per share.  
 
Source: Carpentier et al. (2008) 
 
 
  28 
 
Table 4: Distribution of subsequent financing activity, between 1993 and 2006, of companies newly 
listed on the TSXV. Total gross proceeds (GP) are in CAN$ million. Mean and median time until the 
first subsequent financing is in months. IPO means initial public offering. RM means reverse merger. 
CPC means capital pool company. 
   %  Private Placements  Seasoned offerings 
 
# of 










time total  GP 
Panel A: IPO                               
no financing  484  39.38  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
1 financing  379  30.84  197  28.65  16.39  2351.88 182 20.49  13.68  6363.46 
2 financings  168  13.67  98  26.21  13.83  2461.55 70  20.15  13.22  3723.65 
3 financings  85  6.92  46  23.64  17.18  1542.91 39  18.67  14.19  7005.91 
>=4 financings  113  9.19  62  18.88  9.30  3154.69 51  13.72  11.27  16410.04
Total 1229  100.00  403  25.98  14.32  9511.03 342 19.20  12.57  33503.05
Panel B: RM                            
no financing  274  44.26  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
1 financing  186  30.05  91  28.06  13.86  868.54  95  19.95  7.82  1098.37 
2 financings  74  11.95  53  18.17  10.51  779.16  21  10.85  2.40  1061.27 
3 financings  40  6.46  27  14.14  5.75  525.12  13  15.16  8.48  1110.18 
>=4 financings  45  7.27  32  17.15  6.97  1339.24 13  7.49  3.32  680.43 
Total 619  100.00  203  21.91  9.40  3512.05 142 17.02  6.80  3950.25 
Panel C: Resulting Issuers from CPC                    
no financing  378  46.10  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
1 financing  278  33.90  132  28.48  15.72  707.68  146 15.04  6.19  656.18 
2 financings  78  9.51  47  22.97  6.90  557.60  31  12.75  4.60  603.69 
3  financings  44 5.37 36  14.58  7.74  607.15  8 15.26  7.79  399.79 
>=4  financings  42 5.12 33  26.68  18.04 907.99  9 19.03  14.06  493.26 
Total 820  100.00  248  25.18  12.32  2780.42 194 14.87  6.11  2152.92 
 
 
  29Table 5: Distribution of IPOs, backdoor listings (BL) and all new listings (All) between 
1986 and 2006, by status at the end of the study period (June 2007, Panel A), ten years after 











      Nb  %  Nb  %  Nb  % 
Panel A: Status at the end of the study period , 
1986-2006        
IPOs 1982  1128  56.91 720  36.33  134 6.76 
Backdoor listings   1875  877  46.77  836  44.59  162  8.64 
All new listings   3857  2005  51.98  1556  40.34  296  7.67 
Panel B: Status 10 years after listing           
IPO 1986-1990  1126  391  34.72 693  61.55  42 3.73 
IPO 1991-1995  266  106  39.85 145  54.51  15 5.64 
IPO 1996-1997  137  63  45.99 60  43.80  14 10.22 
IPO 1986-1997  1529  560  36.63 898  58.73  71 4.64 
BL  1986-1990  158  98 62.03  53 33.54 7  4.43 
BL  1991-1995  368  194 52.72  143 38.86 31  8.42 
BL  1996-1997  160  75 46.88  65 40.63 20 12.50 
BL  1986-1997  686  367 53.50  261 38.05 58  8.45 
All  1986-1990  1284  489 38.08  746 58.10 49  3.82 
All  1991-1995  634  300 47.32  288 45.43 46  7.26 
All  1996-1997  297  138 46.46  125 42.09 34  11.45 
All 1986-1997  2215  927  41.85  1159  52.33  129  5.82 
Panel C: Status 5 years after listing       
IPO 1986-1990  1126  178  15.81 938  83.30  10 0.89 
IPO 1991-1995  266  28  10.53 228  85.71  10 3.76 
IPO 1996-1997  379  93  24.54 269  70.98  17 4.49 
IPO 1998-2002  37  11  29.73 23  62.16  3 8.11 
IPO 1986-2002  1808  310  17.15 1458  80.64  40 2.21 
BL  1986-1990  158  60 37.97  93 58.86 5  3.16 
BL 1991-1995  368  72  19.57  276  75.00  20  5.43 
BL  1996-1997  685  224 32.70  420 61.31 41  5.99 
BL  1998-2002  151  67 44.37  74 49.01 10  6.62 
BL  1986-2002  1362  423 31.06  863 63.36 76  5.58 
All 1986-1990  1284  238  18.54  1031  80.30  15  1.17 
All  1991-1995  634  100 15.77  504 79.50 30  4.73 
All  1996-1997  1064  317 29.79  689 64.76 58  5.45 
All  1998-2002  188  78 41.49  97 51.60 13  6.91 
All 1986-2002  3170  733  23.12  2321  73.22  116  3.66 
 
 
  30Table 6: Comparison of Canadian raw returns. Raw returns are measured for newly listed firms 
on the TSXV and the main market (TSX). The internal rate of return of the conventional venture 
capital (VC) comes from the Canadian VC Association. Portfolios are value-weighted. NA means 
not available. 
 
   Annual  Standard 
   Return  Deviation 
    
1,626 newly listed firms on the TSXV, 1986-2006  15.69%  35.40% 
    
TSX S&P Index, 1986-2006  10.70%  14.34% 
    
TSXV S&P Index, 01/2001 to 12/2006  23.57%  23.07% 
    
TSX S&P Index, 01/2001 to 12/2006  13.08%  11.19% 
    
1,144 newly listed firms on the TSXV, 06/1995 to 06/2005  11.96%  34.78% 
    
Internal rate of return of conventional VC, 06/1995 to 06/2005  -3.00%  NA 
    
 
Source: Carpentier et al. (2008) 
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